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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants First Security Corporation (“FSC”) and Richard D. Fosbury (“Fosbury”),
hereby file this reply brief 0n appeal.
A. Statement Of Facts
FSC and Fosbury are unclear What Belle Ranch, LLC (“Belle Ranch”) and Rabo
AgriFinance, LLC (“RABO”)1 means when it says “Appellants’ Statement 0f Facts omits
important material and undisputed facts.” Resp. Br. at 5. FSC and Fosbury have reviewed their
Statement 0f Facts in comparison With Belle Ranch’s Statement of Facts and find no material
differences. A11 recorded documents are discussed, chaining title in 7.5/289th of water right nos.
37-481C, 37-482H, 37—483C, 37-577BT, and 37-2630 (“Water Rights”) t0 FSC and 7.8/289th of
the Water Rights to Fosbury. As expected on appeal, the parties differ in their opinion as t0 the
relevance and importance of certain documents in relation t0 their ownership 0f the Water Rights
in this quiet title action.
III. ARGUMENT
While wanting to paint itself differently, Belle Ranch stands in the “same shoes” as FSC
and Fosbury. Resp. Br. at 20. Seeing Belle Ranch differently is where the district court erred.
FSC, Fosbury, and Belle Ranch are all successors—in-interest to South County, deriving their
respective ownership in the 289/289th of the Water Rights through conveyances made by South
County prior t0 issuance of the SRBA partial decrees in South County’s name. Through those
conveyances, the chain of title shows FSC owns 7.5/289th 0f the Water Rights, Fosbury owns
7.8/289th 0f the Water Rights, and Belle Ranch owns 273.7/289th 0f the Water Rights. Belle
Ranch’s entire response rests on painting itself differently from FSC and Fosbury because of a
1 As stated by Belle Ranch and RABO, “For purposes 0f this appeal, and Where appropriate, the phrase “Belle
Ranch” should be construed t0 mean both Belle Ranch and its secured lender, RABO.” Resp. Br. at 3, fn. 2.
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“window of opportunity” it claims existed after issuance of the SRBA partial decrees in the name 
of South County and before entry of the SRBA district court’s Final Unified Decree.  Resp. Br. at 
15.  During this window, Belle Ranch points to administrative form documents it filed with 
IDWR – not the SRBA district court – to support its ownership of the 7.5/289th owned by FSC 
and the 7.8/289th owned by Fosbury.  This “window of opportunity” was explained in the 
Opening Brief (pages 30-36), and as a matter of law did nothing to affect ownership of the Water 
Rights to the benefit or detriment of the parties before the Court.  The district court erred in 
determining that ownership is defined, not by deeds of record, but instead by administrative form 
documents filed with IDWR after issuance of the SRBA partial decrees and before issuance of 
the SRBA Final Unified Decree. 
A. Belle Ranch Does Not Rebut Key Arguments Presented By FSC And Fosbury  
 
It is important to first highlight arguments FSC and Fosbury made in the Opening Brief 
that are unrebutted by Belle Ranch, demonstrating FSC’s and Fosbury’s respective ownership of 
the 15.3/289th of the Water Rights.  First, Belle Ranch does not disagree that water rights are real 
property that may be lawfully conveyed separately from land.  Opening Br. at 25 citing Joyce 
Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 (2007).  Here, South County followed 
the law when it reserved the 15.3/289th of the Water Rights and conveyed 7.5/289th to FSC’s 
predecessors-in-interest and the and 7.8/289th to Fosbury’s predecessors-in-interest. 
Second, Belle Ranch does not disagree that Idaho is a “race-notice recording state . . . .”  
Opening Br. at 27-28 citing Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P.3d 1052, 1056 
(2013).  Here, the deeds that control ownership of the 15.3/289th were recorded prior to any 
deeds conveying the remaining 273.7/289th to Belle Ranch’s predecessors-in-interest.  See Resp. 
Br., Ex. A. (showing the 15.3/289th was released, conveyed, and recorded by South County as of 
March 1, 2010, which is prior to South County’s June 17, 2010 conveyance of the remaining
273.7/289th to MWB).
Third, Belle Ranch does not disagree that mortgages place “a lien upon everything that
would pass by a grant or conveyance of the property,” LC. § 45-906, and that “a mortgage does
not pass title t0 the mortgaged property,” In Re: 0n Rehearing, 57 Idaho 213, 217,_ P. _,
_ (1 937), but rather subsequent purchasers may take their title subject to a previously recorded
mortgage, Adams v. George, 119 Idaho 973, 976-77, 812 P.2d 280, 283-84 (1991). Here, even if
MWB2 had previously recorded secured interests that were not released, those secured interests
d0 not defeat South County’s conveyances 0f the 15.3/289th t0 FSC and Fosbury’s predecessors-
in-interest. As raised by Belle Ranch, Resp. Br. at 34, and as will be discussed in Section F,
below, the mortgages did not “void” FSC and Fosbury’s ownership.
Fourth, Belle Ranch does disagree that “every estate 0r interest known to the law in real
property . . . may be determined in an action t0 quiet title. Lewiston Lime C0. v. Barney, 87
Idaho 462, 394 P.2d 323 (1964).” Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 260, 668 P.2d 130, 136 (Ct.
App. 1983). Opening Br. at 28. With only one passing reference t0 LC. § 6-401 in relation to a
statute of limitations argument, Resp. Br. at 37, Belle Ranch does not disagree with that statute’s
plain language — Which the district court never examined, applied, or reconciled with Idaho’s
water adjudication statutes in Chapter 14, Title 42, Idaho Code — that actions to quiet title to
water right elements of “source, quantity, point of diversion, place 0f use, nature 0f use, period
0f use, and priority against other water users shall be brought under the provisions 0f chapter 14,
2 MWB and GBCI Other Real Estate, LLC (“GBCI”) expressly disclaimed any interest in these proceedings. R2.
349-5 1. Pursuant to an express written agreement With Idaho Independent Bank With regard t0 the 7.5/289‘h 0f the
Water Rights owned by FSC, MWB released all of its interest in the 7.5/289th owned by FSC and the 7.8/289th
owned by Fosbury, then entered into a deed in lieu to obtain the land and the rest of the water, which was later
deeded to GBCI and eventually to Belle Ranch. Opening Br. at 7-10. MWB and GBCI have chosen not to file any
responsive briefing. Order Re: Respondents
’
Brief— Docket N0. 46144-2018/46147-2018 (May 13, 2019).
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title 42, Idaho Code.” I.C. § 6-401. Idaho’s quiet title statute does not mention ownership,
“name and address of the claimant,” I.C. § 42-1409(1)(a), or any semblance 0f those words. “A
cardinal rule 0f statutory construction is that Where a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous,
courts are constrained to follow that plain meaning, and neither add to the statute nor take away
bV judicial construction.” Kemmer v. Newman, 161 Idaho 463, 467-68, 387 P.3d 131, 135-36
(2016) (emphasis added). Here, the parties to this appeal agree that the presiding judge of the
SRBA, sitting in his capacity as a district court judge, could make decisions as to ownership, see
United States v. Pioneer Irr. Dist, 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007); Cash v. Cash, Case N0.
CV-2016-02 (Camas County),3 yet can point to nothing in the record that the district court
exercised its jurisdiction to quiet title to anything other than the traditional elements of an Idaho
water right, as expressed in I.C. § 6-401. Therefore, the question of ownership of these Water
Rights was never raised, addressed, or established through the SRBA. If ownership was decided,
the only outcome is the Water Rights are owned by South County. This is because South County
is listed in the “name and address” field of the Water Rights. See Opening Br. at 36-37.
Fifth, Belle Ranch does not contest the affirmative statements made by IDWR in this
record through an affidavit of staff and correspondence from its deputy attorneys general that the
Department does not possess the legal authority t0 determine ownership: “IDWR only maintains
and updates water right ownership records pursuant t0 Idaho Code Section 42-248. . . . . The
appropriate forum t0 resolve a dispute over ownership is a district court.” Opening Br. at 17
citing R. 837 and 843. IDWR’S understanding 0f its statutory authority is entitled t0 deference.
A & B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dept. 0f Water Res., 154 Idaho 652, 653-54, 301 P.3d 1270, 1271-72
(2012). Therefore, documents filed with IDWR asserting ownership can do nothing more than
3 The district court decision in Cash v. Cash was appended to Belle Ranch’s brief in response and Will be discussed
below in Section D.
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update a record and cannot operate t0 unravel Idaho’s well established and recognized
conveyance and recording system, I.C. §§ 55-601, 55-809, 55-810, and 55-81 1, 55-812. The
district court never addressed 0r reconciled IDWR’S statements With Idaho’s adjudication, quiet
title, and recording statutes.
B. There Was N0 Window Of Opportunity For Belle Ranch To Take Away The
15.3/289th From FSC And Fosbury
Citing LC. § 42-1409, Belle Ranch criticizes FSC and Fosbury’s for not filing “a notice
0f claim” in the SRBA, Resp. Br. at 23, 26 citing LC. § 42-1409; yet, neither did Belle Ranch.
The only action Belle Ranch can hang its hat 0n t0 differentiate itself from FSC and Fosbury is a
“Window 0f opportunity” Belle Ranch says existed in the SRBA that allowed Belle Ranch, and
only Belle Ranch, t0 take ownership of the entire 289/289th in direct contravention 0f the deeds
of record and their having no less than constructive notice 0f FSC’S and Fosbury’s respective
interests. Resp. Br. at 15. As discussed in the Opening Brief (pages 30-36), the opportunity
Belle Ranch claims it availed itself 0fwas filing form documents with IDWR, after the SRBA
partial decrees were issued 0n August 3 1, 2010, and before the Final Unified Decree was issued
0n August 26, 2014.
Because 0f this, Belle Ranch’s citation t0 the Final Unified Decree’s sanctioning of
“administrative changes to the elements of a water rightm entry 0f a partial decree, butm
to the entry of this Final Unified Decree,” Resp. Br. at 32 citing Final Unified Decree (emphasis
added), goes directly t0 What IDWR is statutorily authorized t0 do, and not d0. As discussed,
IDWR has n0 authority t0 and therefore cannot alter deeded ownership 0f water rights. IDWR is
statutorily authorized to change only the “point of diversion, place of use, period of use or nature
0f use,” LC. § 42-2220), of an SRBA partial decree. IDWR can d0 nothing more. “An
administrative agency is a creature 0f statute, limited to the power and authority granted to it by
REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 5
the Legislature . . . .” Welch v. Del Monte Corp, 128 Idaho 513, 514, 915 P.2d 1371, 1372
(1996) (emphasis added). Due t0 an express lack of authority, no documents filed With IDWR
after issuance 0f the SRBA partial decrees and before entry of the SRBA Final Unified Decree
establish title against the deeds 0f record in Blaine County. Belle Ranch is asking this Court to
overturn established law that the only way t0 bifurcate ownership of the underlying real property
and the water right is to specifically reserve the water right in the conveyance document. Joyce
Livestock. The SRBA Final Unified Decree does not strip the water right from the property.
C. IDWR Has N0 Statutory Authority T0 Alter Deeds Of Record
In its Memorandum Decision 0n Motionfor Reconsideration ofSummary Judgment, the
district court incorrectly held that a change of ownership With IDWR could be effectuated
through LC. § 42-222. R. 1931. Belle Ranch attempts to support the district court’s incorrect
understanding 0fIDWR’S authority by stating: “A water right transfer i[s] a permanent 0r long-
term change to a water right’s point of diversion 0r a change t0 the place 0f use, period of use,
and/or nature ofuse and ownership. I.C. § 42-222; R. 1196. . . . . Contrary t0 Appellants’
assertions, I.C. § 42-248(4) specifically provides that change of ownership can be accomplished
under a Section 42-222 transfer proceeding. The law could not be more clear.” Resp. Br. at 29
(emphasis added).
Again, IDWR, by its own admission, possesses no statutory authority t0 alter deeded
ownership: “IDWR maintains and updates water right ownership records pursuant t0 Idaho Code
§ 42-248. . . . . IDWR does not have the legal authority to determine ownership of a water
right.” R. 36-37 (emphasis added). Therefore, even though IDWR updates its records through
filings made pursuant to LC. § 42-248, that statute gives IDWR n0 authority t0 alter deeded
ownership.
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By its plain language, a water right transfer filed pursuant t0 I.C. § 42-2220) allows
IDWR t0 change only four (4) elements of an SRBA partial decree: “point of diversion, place of
u_se, period 0f use or nature of use . . . .” LC. § 42-2220). The plain meaning of the statute
controls, State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3, 343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015), with IDWR being limited, as a
“creature 0f statute . . . t0 the power and authority granted to it by the Legislature . . . .” Welch at
5 14, 915 P.2d at 1372. An administrative transfer proceeding can result in a change t0 the only
four elements of an SRBA partial decree that are before IDWR in the transfer, LC. § 42-2220),
and cannot be confused With other actions performed by IDWR, such as updating the agency’s
record through LC. § 42-248. Said differently, IDWR is statutorily precluded from changing
four (4) other water right elements of an SRBA partial decree: “name and address of the
99 66 99 66
claimant, the source 0f water, the quantity of water,” and “the date 0f priority.” I.C. § 42-
141 1(2)(a) — (d). Due to IDWR’s limited statutory authority, that Belle Ranch filed documents
with IDWR pursuant t0 LC. § 42-222 and LC. § 42-248, does nothing to defeat FSC and
Fosbury’s previously recorded, deeded ownership in the 15.3/289th 0f the Water Rights.
D. Judge Wildman’s Decision In Cash v. Cash Foreshadowed This Case Where Title T0
Water And Land Is Bifurcated
Belle Ranch attempts to support the district court through citation t0 the Honorable Eric
J. Wildman’s decision in Camas County in Cash v. Cash, Which Belle Ranch attaches to its
Response Brief as Exhibit C.4 Based 0n the facts before him, Judge Wildman held ownership of
water right nos. 37-444, 37-2541 and 37-7636 was determined in the SRBA. There, in 1989,
Philip Cash “filed notices of claim for the three water rights at issue in the SRBA. He identified
himself as the sole claimant of the rights in his claims. On December 5, 2006, the Director 0f
4 Belle Ranch and RABO attach Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and Exhibit C t0 their Joint Response Brief. The contents 0f
Exhibit A and Exhibit B are generally accurate, but d0 omit some key documents.
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[IDWR] issued his recommendations for the claims.  He recommended the claims be decreed in 
the name of Philip Cash as sole owner.”  Cash at 2.  “These water rights were previously decreed 
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (“SRBA”) to Respondent Philip Cash.  Notwithstanding, 
Judge Elgee subsequently quieted title in the rights to the Petitioner based on pre-decree 
considerations.  In doing so, Judge Elgee offended principles of res judicata by failing to place 
appropriate weight on the SRBA proceeding and the water right decrees entered as a result of 
that proceeding.”  Cash at 2.  Unlike the record in this case, Philip Cash owned the water rights 
before, during, and after the SRBA.  If the plain reading is correct, then the only outcome this 
Court can follow is that the SRBA was the last word on ownership; meaning, South County 
continues to own the entire 289/289th of the Water Rights.  See Opening Br. at 36-37. 
Belle Ranch attempts to distinguish the plain reading of Cash by directing the Court to 
the “window of opportunity” that existed after the SRBA partial decrees were issued in the name 
of South County and before entry of the Final Unified Decree.  Resp. Br. at 15.  As previously 
addressed, the Final Unified Decree simply recognized the validity of IDWR administrative 
actions that could affect the four elements of an SRBA partial decrees that were statutorily 
capable of being altered by IDWR.  Opening Br. at 32-36.  As a creature of statute, IDWR had 
no authority to determine, alter, or change ownership; therefore, no actions Belle Ranch took 
with IDWR before entry of the Final Unified Decree could affect ownership.  Had Belle Ranch 
filed documents with the SRBA district court, which it did not, the outcome could be different. 
According to Belle Ranch, I.C. § 42-1411(2) and I.C. § 42-1412(6) “unequivocally link[] 
the claimant to ownership of the water right.”  Resp. Br. at 24.  While this may be true when 
unity of title exists between land and water, it is equally true that when ownership of water has 
been reserved from land as allowed for by law, Joyce Livestock, the presumption may not stand.  
Not referenced by Belle Ranch is Judge Wildman’s observation — seemingly anticipating this
case — that in the absence of unity 0f title, the name and address element of an SRBA partial
decree may not be dispositive:
The Court further notes that while the appurtenance 0f a water right t0 a particular
piece of land may be relevant t0 determining ownership of that water right in some
circumstances, it is not in and of itself dispositive of the issue of ownershipw
circumstances. It is true that very often the owner 0f a piece of land is also the
owner of the water rights appurtenant t0 that land. However, it can be equally true
that the owner 0f a piece of land is not the owner of the water rights appurtenant t0
that land. Indeed, is has long been held that “water may be appropriated for
beneficial use 0n land not owned by the appropriator, and this water right becomes
the property of the appropriator.” First Security Bank 0f Blackfoot v. State, 49
Idaho 740, 291 P. 1064 (1930). Thus, Idaho law recognizes there maV be a
bifurcation between ownership of the land and of the water right used 0n the land.
Cash at 8 (emphasis added).
Here, Judge Wildman’s observation is directly applicable t0 the case at hand and should
be recognized When, as here, ownership 0f the water has been “bifurcated” from land.
Consistent with the chain of events documented in Exhibit A t0 the Response Brief, and by
March 1, 2010, the 15.3/289th was bifurcated, conveyed, and recorded in Blaine County. By
June 17, 2010, the remaining 273.7/289th was conveyed from South County to MWB through a
Deed in Lieu 0f Foreclosure (“MWB Deed in Lieu”). R. 657;5 Resp. Br. at 7. These events
happenedm the “June 28, 2010 . . . Special Master’s Report and Recommendation for each
of the Water Rights, . . . the July 9, 2010 . . . Amended Special Master’s Report and
Recommendation, . . . [and the] August 31, 2010 . . . Order of Partial Decrees.” Resp. Br. at 13.
Thus, before the SRBA district court began issuing reports of the special master and partial
decrees, South County owned no amount 0f the Water Rights. Without unity of title, the
rationale of Judge Wildman leads to reversing the district court, recognizing the deeds of record
5 By its express terms the MWB Deed in Lieu ofForeclosure was a “quitclaim” deed. R. 657.
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in Blaine County control FSC’s and Fosbury’s respective ownership of the 15.3/289th of the
Water Rights, and quieting title thereto.
E. FSC’s And Fosbury’s Claims Are Not Void Due T0 Mountain West Bank’s Second
And Third Mortgages
Belle Ranch argues any conveyances that were recorded after MWB’s second and third
mortgages were “void” pursuant to LC. § 55-812. Resp. Br. at 34. Idaho Code § 55-812 states:
“Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one (1) year is
void against any subsequent purchaser 0r mortgagee 0f the same property, 0r any part thereof, in
good faith and for valuable consideration, Whose conveyance is first duly recorded.” I.C. § 55-
8 12. “A duly recorded interest is effective against prior unrecorded interests only where the
recorded interest is taken for a valuable consideration and in good faith, i.e., ‘Without knowledge,
3”
either actual or constructive, that the unrecorded interests exist. Langroz'se v. Becker, 96 Idaho
218, 220, 526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974).
First, a mortgage is an encumbrance 0n real property and does not operate t0 defeat a
later conveyance of title. In Re: Rehearing at 217, P. at ; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. C0.
v. Girard, 57 Idaho 198, 217, 64 P.2d 254,_ (1936). Even ifMWB’s previously recorded
secured interests were not released, those secured interests do not defeat South County’s
conveyances 0f the 15.3/289th t0 FSC’S and Fosbury’s predecessors—in—interest.
Second, Belle Ranch’s argument does not apply because the record shows MWB had
actual knowledge of the release 0f its security interests in the entire 15.3/289th due t0 the MWB
Letter Agreement, R. 15 1 3, and the MWB Partial Releases.6 A Deed in Lieu ofForeclosure
Agreement (“DIL Agreement”) was also executed between MWB and South County, Charles
6 The term “MWB Partial Releases” refers t0 the seven Partial Release[s] ofLien that were executed and recorded
by MWB. See Resp. Br., Ex. A and Opening Br. at 7.
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Holt, and John Scherer. R. 1615. The DIL Agreement “clarif[ied] that the water rights were not
included in the conveyance t0 MWB, MWB added an Addendum t0 the Deed in Lieu of
Foreclosure Agreement (‘Addendum’) Which expressly recognized the Partial Releases.” R.
1596. See also R. 1513-14 (MWB Letter Agreement); R. 1509 (recognizing the MWB Partial
Releases as “defects . . . affecting title . . . .”).
F. Payment Of Water District Assessments And Use Of Water Is Not An Issue In This
Proceeding
This is an action for quiet title, with all parties to the proceeding moving the district court
t0 quiet title t0 their ownership. Belle Ranch adds for this Court’s consideration that it has been
the one “using the water . . . .” Resp. Br. at 46. The question for the Court t0 decide in this quiet
title appeal is ownership. Use, non-use, or defenses thereto of the Water Rights is a separate
proceeding. See Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. 0f Water Res., 138 Idaho 83 1, 70 P.3d 669
(2003) (discussion of the laws 0f forfeiture and defenses thereto).
G. Belle Ranch Cannot Claim Adverse Possession In Water District N0. 37
Referencing Water District No. 37 delivery records and citing this Court’s prior decision
in Hillcrest Irr. Dist. v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 57 Idaho 403, 66 P.2d 115 (1937), Belle
Ranch argues it is entitled to the 15.3/289th through a theory 0f adverse possession 0r forfeiture.
“This Court held that Hillcrest had used the water after the transfer and that title to the water
should be quieted in Hillcrest’s name. Id. at 412. In Hillcrest the adverse use 0f the water
following the transfer was twenty years. Here the adverse use has been since the 2011 irrigation
season and then the 2012 transfer. Appellants do not explain why five irrigation seasonsm
u_se following a transfer Where they sat idly on their rights, is not sufficient. Compare LC. § 42-
222(2) (all rights are lost or forfeited for five years of n0n-use).” Resp. Br. at 31 (emphasis
added).
REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 11
First, the Water Rights are located in a water district, which in this case is Water District
N0. 37. The law specifically forbids adverse possession in a water district. LC. § 42-607 (“So
long as a duly elected watermaster is charged With the administration of the waters Within a
water district, n0 water user within such district can adversely possess the right of anV other
water user.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Belle Ranch cannot claim ownership of the
15.3/289th through adverse possession.
Second, and as stated above, this is an action to quiet title, not a legal proceeding t0
determine use, non-use, 0r defenses against forfeiture. If there were a finding 0f forfeiture,
Which there cannot because the question was not before the district court, and if n0 defenses to
forfeiture could be established, LC. § 42-223 (enumerating defenses against forfeiture), then
“rights t0 such water shall revert t0 the state and be again subj ect to appropriation under this
chapter; except that any right t0 the use of water shall not be lost through forfeiture by the failure
to apply the water t0 beneficial use under certain circumstances as specified in section 42-223,
Idaho Code.” I.C. § 42-222(2) (emphasis added). Reversion 0f rights to the State does not vest
ownership in Belle Ranch.
H. The Appeal Is Not Barred By LC. § 5-224 And This Court’s Decision In Brown v.
Greenheart
Belle Ranch raises an independent issue on appeal that the district court should be
affirmed due to the expiration of a four-year statute 0f limitation. Resp. Br. at 36. In support of
its argument, Belle Ranch cites I.C. § 5-224 and this Court’s decision in Brown v. Greenheart,
157 Idaho 156, 335 P.3d 1 (2014). N0 statute of limitations should apply to divest FSC and
Fosbury of their respective ownership in the 15.3/289th of the Water Rights. Alternatively, if a
statute of limitations were to apply, it cannot begin working against any party t0 this appeal until
an adverse claim was learned 0f.
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First, no statute of limitations applies against FSC and Fosbury because MWB never had
title to the 15.3/289th t0 convey t0 Belle Ranch, due t0 the MWB Partial Releases, the MWB
Deed in Lieu, and the Estoppel Certificate, R. 1049. Because MWB never had title t0 any part 0f
the 15.3/289th, no interest could have conveyed to GBCI or on to Belle Ranch. Without title,
there can be no application of I.C. § 5-224 and, by extension, the Court’s decision in Brown.
Second, the district court never made a decision as t0 passage 0f any statute 0f
limitations; therefore, the issue is not in front of this Court. R. 1820 (“Respondents raise
alternate theories of laches and statute of limitations in their Motion. [T]he Court . . . does not
reach the alternate theories raised by Respondents.”) (emphasis added); R. 1932 (“Itgm that
the statute of limitations has run . . . . However, this issue is n_ot necessary t0 this decision”)
(emphasis added).
Third, even assuming for the sake of argument that a four-year statute of limitations does
apply, it did not begin t0 accrue until January 13, 2015 or thereafter. In Brown, a question raised
was When does a “cause of action for quiet title accrue where another person claims an interest in
property ‘adverse to’ another.” Brown at 162, 335 P. 3d at 8. There, the Court looked at the
chain of events, determining accrual of the claim began when the Browns “learned” 0f
Greenheart’s action t0 change IDWR’S water right records:
On February 17, 2012, allegedly Without notice t0 the Browns, Greenheart filed a
notice 0f change of ownership With the Idaho Department 0f Water Resources
(“IDWR”). On March 22, 2012, the IDWR revised its records to indicate that
Greenheart was the current owner 0f a portion 0f the water rights held by Browns
and reduced the quantity 0f rights held by the Browns.
It was not until the Browns learned from an attorney that there might be a mistake
in the deed, and oan after Greenheart apparently perceived an opportunity to take
advantage 0f the Browns, that for the first time Greenheart claimed an interest in
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the Browns’ water rights by filing a notice with the IDWR. At no time before 2012
was there any action bV Greenheart adverse t0 the Browns’ water rights.
Id. at 160-162; 335 P.3d at 5-7 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, the test from Brown as to the accrual 0f the four-year statute 0f limitations is
When did anyone “learn[]” — like the Browns as t0 Greenheart — 0f an adverse interest? In
Brown, and as to actions in front of IDWR, Greenheart’s adverse interest became known because
actual notice was given to the Browns by IDWR. R. 1587; R. 1534-35. The mailing of actual
notice by IDWR to the Browns allowed IDWR t0 meet its mandatory notice requirement in LC.
§ 42-248(3) (“The director of the department 0f water resources will be deemed t0 have provided
notice concerning any action by the director affecting a water right or claim if a notice of the
action is mailed t0 the address and owner of the water right shown in the records of the
department 0f water resources at the time of mailing the notice.”) (emphasis added). The notice
started the clock running on the statute of limitations.
Here, there was no compliance with the notice requirement in LC. § 42-248(3) until
January 13, 2015, 0r thereafter. When ownership was “changed” from South County to MWB
0n or around September 30, 201 1, South County was entitled t0 notice from IDWR, yet received
none. R. 679, 1597. Ownership was changed t0 MWB 0n or around that date despite MWB
owning nothing at the time as it had deeded away its ownership to GBCI 0n June 17, 2010.
When IDWR purportedly changed ownership from MWB (Who again owned nothing due to its
prior conveyance t0 GBCI) to Belle Ranch, n0 notice was provided t0 anyone. R. 692, R. 1597.7
Despite Idaho Independent Bank’s (“11B”) notice of security interest 0n file with IDWR, R. 656,
7 While Belle Ranch claims that the “transfer” it filed With IDWR constituted notice, Resp. Br. at 39, the transfer
could accomplish no more than what Belle Ranch asked IDWR to do, which was to simply alter the legal description
for its place of use. Opening Br. at 14. Moreover, as discussed in this reply, ownership cannot be changed by
IDWR because it lacks the statutory authority to d0 so. See also Opening Br. at 33-36.
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which entitled it to notice “ofm proposed or final action to amend, transfer or otherwise
modify that water right,” I.C. § 42-248(6) (emphasis added), n0 notice was provided. By failing
t0 provide notice, this meant the requirements of I.C. § 42-248(3) were unfulfilled, making it
impossible for anyone to learn of what actions were being taken.
In stark contrast, 0n January 13, 2015, and exactly as was done in Brown, IDWR
provided actual notice t0 Belle Ranch, copied t0 Rabo, 0f its decision to change ownership in the
7.5/289th t0 FSC. R. 785. Fifteen months later, on March 21, 2016, Belle Ranch eventually
challenged IDWR’S decision as t0 FSC’s ownership. R. 786.8 IDWR later responded it did not
have the legal authority to resolve the dispute, directing the parties to quiet title. R. 843; see also
R. 37 and R. 837. Thereafter, 0n June 3, 2016, IDWR informed Fosbury that his change of
ownership documents filed With IDWR could not be addressed. R. 577. Following the legal
advice of IDWR, complaints to quiet title were filed by the parties with the district court in
December 2016, R. 14; R3. 9, well within four years 0f learning of the adverse interest.
Consistent With Brown, the first time the mandatory requirements of I.C. § 42-248(3) were met
as t0 FSC was January 13, 2015. As t0 Fosbury, the earliest he could have learned of Belle
Ranch’s adverse interest, through notification by IDWR, was June 3, 2016, the date IDWR
declined t0 process his change of ownership request. Under both dates, the four-year statute 0f
limitations has not expired.
8 Did Belle Ranch and Rabo intentionally chose to sit on their position for 15 months in order to bolster their claim
that the four-year statute 0f limitations had run? By waiting 15 months, Belle Ranch now creates an argument that
the four-year statute 0f limitations ran.
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I. FSC’s And Fosbury’s Ownership Of The 15.3/289‘“ Of The Water Rights Should
Not Be Denied Under Theories Of Equitable Estoppel, Quasi—Estoppel, And/Or
Waiver
As independent issue on appeal, Belle Ranch argues the appeal should be denied based
0n the theories of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or waiver. The basis of the argument is
the Estoppel Certificate, executed by “John Scherer, the managing member 0f South County . . .
.” Resp. Br. at 41. Belle Ranch cannot establish the elements to meet these defenses.
i. Equitable Estoppel
To prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it must be shown:
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not
know 0r could not discover the truth; (3) that the false representation or
concealment was made With the intent that it be relied upon; and (4) that the person
to whom the representation was made, 0r from where the facts were concealed,
relied and acted upon the representation 0r concealment t0 his prejudice.
J.R. Simplot C0. v. Chemetics Intern, Ina, 126 Idaho 532, 534, 887 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1994).
Belle Ranch cannot prevail under this theory because it cannot satisfy the first element.
Belle Ranch has not identified what alleged “false representation” was made “With actual 0r
constructive knowledge.” Throughout, FSC and Fosbury have maintained they own the
15.3/289th of the Water Rights and have never made any representation t0 the contrary.
Herrmann v. Woodwell, 107 Idaho 916, 922, 693 P.2d 1118, 1124 (Ct. App. 1985) (“For
equitable estoppel t0 apply, the Herrmanns must have made a false representation 0r
concealment of a material fact with actual 0r constructive knowledge 0f the truth”).
ii. Ouasi-Estoppel
Turning to the theory of quasi-estoppel, it “prevents a party from successfully asserting a
position inconsistent with a previously-taken position, with knowledge of the facts and of its
rights, t0 the detriment 0f the person seeking t0 invoke it.” Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners’
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Assoc, Inc. v. Bulotti C0nst., Ina, 145 Idaho 17, 22, 175 P.3d 179, 184 (2007). “Furthermore,
for quasi-estoppel t0 apply, it must be unconscionable to allow the party t0 be estopped t0
maintain an inconsistent position.” Id. (emphasis added). “Quasi-estoppel is essentially a Iait-
gasp theory under which a defendant who can point to n0 specific detrimental reliance due to
plaintiffs’ conduct may still assert that plaintiffs are estopped from asserting allegedly contrary
positions Where it would be unconscionable for them to d0 so.” Schoonover v. Bonner County,
113 Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988) (emphasis added).
First, and as just stated, FSC and Fosbury have never changed positions regarding their
ownership of the 15.3/289th. Instead, FSC and Fosbury have maintained their interest stems from
the MWB Partial Releases and subsequent deeds from South County. Contrary to the argument
0f Belle Ranch, this ownership is supported by the Estoppel Certificate, which expressly
references the MWB Partial Releases and the Litigation Guarantee. R. 1049. Belle Ranch’s
attempt to twist the language of the Estoppel Certificate to “include[]” instead of exclude the
15.3/289th is non-sensical. Resp. Br. at 42. The Estoppel Certificate confirms that the 15.3/289th
was not conveyed by South County t0 MWB, due t0 the fact that the MWB Partial Releases were
not included in the extensive list 0f conveyed items. R. 1050. Instead, they were simply
referenced in a separate sentence at the end of the paragraph. If FSC’s and Fosbury’s
predecessor had intended for the conveyance t0 include the 15.3/289th, then it would have
executed quitclaim deeds conveying the interest t0 MWB. However, it did not. The fact that the
MWB Partial Releases were not included as a conveyance t0 MWB is fithher evidenced by
paragraph 12 of the Estoppel Certificate, Which states that the property is “free and clear 0f all
liens . . . encumbrances and claims” except those in the “litigation guarantee.” R. 105 1. The
plain language of the Litigation Guarantee specifically identified the MWB Partial Releases as
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“defects, liens, encumbrances or other matters affecting title . . . .” R. 1509. “The reference to
the Partial Releases in the Estoppel Certificate were included t0 clarify that MWB n0 longer had
any interest in those portions of South County’s water rights.” R. 1596.
Second, there can be no finding of quasi-estoppel because there is no unconscionable
result arising from any purported change in position. This is because MWB never had any
interest in the 15.3/289th t0 convey to GBCI and by extension to Belle Ranch. Therefore, Belle
Ranch has never been entitled to the 15.3/289th and cannot sustain an unconscionable result.
iii. Waiver
Last, Belle Ranch advances a theory of waiver t0 defeat FSC’s and Fosbury’s title to the
15.3/289th of the Water Rights. Waiver “is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known
right 0r advantage.” Frontier Fed. Sav. And Loan Ass ’n. v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 812, 853
P.2d 553, 557 (1992) (internal citations omitted). It is a question of intent Which will not be
inferred by instead requires the party asserting waiver t0 show “a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting an intent t0 waive.” Km’pe Land C0. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457, 259 P.3d
595, 603 (201 1). Silence is not sufficient t0 establish waiver. Id. Additionally, the party
asserting waiver must “show that he acted in reasonable reliance upon [the waiver] and that he
thereby has altered his position to his detriment.” Id.
Here, FSC and Fosbury never intended to relinquish any portion of their rights to the
15.3/289th. As stated above, Belle Ranch’s reliance on the reference to the MWB Partial
Releases in the Estoppel Certificate is simply an attempt to create confusion, falling short When
the Estoppel Certificate and Litigation Guarantee are read as a Whole, particularly when
considering the facts and circumstances regarding execution 0f the Estoppel Certificate. R.
1596. Even if Belle Ranch could somehow establish equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, or
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waiver, it would still not receive title to the 15.3/289th; instead, title to the Water Rights would
remain with South County, pursuant to the plain language of the SRBA partial decrees.
J. The District Court’s Judgment Should Omit Reference To Secured Interests Of
Creditors
According t0 RABO, “[T]his Court should affirm not only that Belle Ranch owns the
entirety of the Water Rights, but that the entirety 0f the Water Rights are encumbered by
RABO’S properly perfected security interest.” Resp. Br. at 44. RABO is incorrect. First, the
issue 0f secured interests was not addressed by the district court until it entered its Judgment.
Opening Br. at 39. There was n0 citation by the district court to a document that supports What
RABO’S secured interest is 0r is not. Belle Ranch and RABO have similarly not identified a
document in their Joint Response Brief.
Second, RABO ignores that MWB affirmatively released its secured interest in favor 0f
HB, R. 15 13, allowing IIB to record a mortgage (“11B Mortgage”) on June 25, 2009, R. 638,
Which was superior to the secured interest 0fMWB. FSC is a successor t0 IIB. Additionally,
IIB filed a UCC Financing Statement With the Idaho Secretary 0f State 0n June 26, 2009, R.
1500, perfecting its security interest in the collateral. Keybank Nat’l Ass ’n v. PAL I, LLC, 155
Idaho 287, 290, 311 P.3d 299, 302 (2013). The IIB Mortgage and UCC Financing Statement
were filed well before RABO “loaned money t0 Belle Ranch . . . .” Resp. Br. at 43 (Without
citation to a mortgage between RABO and Belle Ranch).9 Therefore, the previously recorded
HB Mortgage and UCC Financing Statement, to Which FSC is a successor, is superior, U.S. Bank
N.A. v. CitiMortgage, Ina, 157 Idaho 446, 452, 337 P.3d 605, 611 (2014) (“a mortgage recorded
9 Belle Ranch acquired the land and the 273.7/289th of the Water Rights 0n 0r around December 20, 201 1, the date
When GBCI and MWB executed deeds conveying the property t0 Belle Ranch. See Ex. A t0 Resp. Br. Exhibit A
does not list a RABO mortgage 0r other security interest.
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first in time has priority against all other subsequent mortgages”), with no evidence in the record 
showing the secured interest was released or foreclosed. 
Third, whatever argument RABO is making appears as if it wants to stand in the shoes of 
MWB, despite MWB disclaiming any interest in this appeal and filing no responsive briefing.  
For these reasons, the district court’s Judgment should be corrected to omit reference to the 
secured interests of any creditor. 
IV. BELLE RANCH SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IN THIS CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION 
 
Belle Ranch moves this Court for an award of costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to I.C. § 
12-121, I.A.R. 35, 40, and 41.  “The Court will award fees to a prevailing part under Idaho Code 
section 12-121 when the Court believes that the action was pursued, defended, or brought 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”  Resp. Br. at 44 citing Thornton v. Pandrea, 
161 Idaho 301, 320, 385 P.3d 856, 875 (2016).  “Appellants have done just that.  Appellants 
have pursued this lawsuit and appeal without a sound legal or factual theory in the face of 
overwhelming legal precedent and clear statutory requirements.”  Resp. Br. at 44. 
 This could not be further from the truth.  This is a novel case of first impression that has 
been fairly pursued by all parties.  The Court has never been asked to address the interaction 
between I.C. § 6-401, I.C. § 42-222, I.C. § 42-248, Idaho’s water adjudication statutes, Idaho’s 
conveyance and recording statutes, and Paragraph 13(1) of the Final Unified Decree.  Regardless 
of how the Court rules, its decision will establish how owners of water rights and holders of 
secured interests in river basins that have undergone, or will undergo, a general stream 
adjudication must perfect their rights.  This includes not only the entire Snake River Basin, but 
also other areas of the State where general stream adjudications have been authorized.  I.C. § 42-
1406B (statutory authorization for the “Northern Idaho water rights adjudications” in the “Coeur 
d’Alene-Spokane river basin, the Palouse river basin, and the Clark-Fork Pend Oreille river
”).
10 As a case of first impression With far-ranging implications, it is inappropriate tobasins
award costs and fees pursuant t0 LC. § 12-121. Doe v. Doe, 160 Idaho 31 1, 317, 372 P.3d 366,
372 (2016) (“Because we have not previously addressed whether a court could appoint part-time
co-guardians, we will not award attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121”); Hoagland v.
Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 916, 303 P.3d 587, 603 (2013) (“Attorneys fees are not warranted
where a novel legal question is presented”); Trunnell v. Fergel, 153 Idaho 68, 72, 278 P.3d 938,
942 (2012) (“A party is not entitled t0 attorney’s fees if the issue is one 0f first impression in
Idaho.”).
V. CONCLUSION
Based 0n the foregoing, this matter is not barred by resjudicata, allowing ownership of
7.5/289th of the Water Rights to be quieted t0 FSC and ownership 0f 7.8/289th of the Water
Rights to be quieted t0 Fosbury. The “window in time” relied upon by the district court and
Belle Ranch t0 allow administrative documents filed With IDWR before entry of the Final
Unified Decree to alter the deeds 0f record in Blaine County is incorrect, due to the fact that
IDWR, by its own admission, has n0 statutory authority to alter ownership. If this action is
barred by resjudicata, the only outcome is the Water Rights are owned in their entirety by South
County. Under any outcome, and With the issue not squarely before it, the district court’s
Judgment should be corrected to omit any reference t0 the secured interests 0f creditors. Lastly,
1° The Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication has been commenced With issues beginning to come to this
Court. See Docket No. 45381-2017 (federal reserved claims filed by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe). The Palouse River
Basin Adjudication was commenced 0n March 1, 2017, In Re: The General Adjudication ofRights t0 the Use 0f
Waterfrom the Palouse River Basin Water System, Case N0. 59576 (Twin Falls County), and is starting the process
0f accepting claims.
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as a case of first impression, the Court should deny Belle Ranch’s motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs.
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